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larger economies of Italy and Spain, and their interest 
rates have risen signiﬁ cantly. The markets do not foresee 
an end to this crisis, which is reﬂ ected in the high rates 
of return on the government bonds of the crisis-stricken 
countries.
Greece, Portugal and Ireland, as well as Italy and Spain 
to a lesser extent, are among the group of unstable eu-
rozone countries. The ﬁ nancial markets consider invest-
ments in these countries to be signiﬁ cantly riskier than in 
Germany, for example. This is why their interest rates for 
ten-year government bonds have increased signiﬁ cantly 
in recent months (see Figure 1). In January 2012, ten-
year government bond yields were over 25% for Greece, 
13% for Portugal, 7% for Ireland, 6% for Italy, and 5% 
for Spain. Germany, France, the Netherlands, Finland 
and Austria are among the stable eurozone countries. 
They are able to procure capital in the ﬁ nancial markets 
at relatively low interest rates. For example, in January 
2012, Germany paid less than two per cent interest on 
ten-year government bonds. France and Austria paid 
around three per cent.1
The markets are now almost as uncertain as they were 
during the ﬁ nancial crisis of 2008. To prevent a credit 
crunch, the European Central Bank (ECB) released the 
record sum of EUR 489bn in three-year loans to the eu-
rozone’s commercial banks in December 2011. The av-
erage life of ECB loans thus increased from a mere ten 
weeks to 21 months.2 Nevertheless, in January 2012, 
the funds of the ECB’s deposit facility reached an all-
time high of over EUR 500bn, despite a very low interest 
rate of 0.25%.3 When banks cease to trade liquid assets 
in the overnight market, this is a clear sign of their in-
1 See http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/long/html/index.en.html.
2 See The Economist, 31 December 2011, http://www.economist.com/
node/21542187.
3 See ECB: Monthly Bulletin – Euro Area Statistics Online, January 
2012.
Although Switzerland is a member of neither the Euro-
pean Monetary Union nor the European Union, the euro 
crisis is ﬁ nding its way into this country. In the summer 
of 2011, the euro and Swiss franc were brieﬂ y at parity 
for the ﬁ rst time since the European single currency had 
been introduced. The rise of the Swiss franc against the 
crisis-ridden euro was only stopped by the introduction 
of a minimum exchange rate of 1.20 francs to the euro 
by the Swiss National Bank (SNB). This means, however, 
that the Swiss franc is still overvalued. The strength of 
the Swiss franc has meanwhile affected not only the bal-
ance sheet of the SNB but also the Swiss economy. The 
consequences are revenue losses in the tourist industry, 
a drop in exports, a weak economy and job losses.
In the following, the impact of the euro crisis on the 
Swiss economy is examined in detail. An overview of the 
situation in the euro countries is given, three possible 
scenarios for managing the crisis are discussed, the de-
velopment of the euro-Swiss franc exchange rate is pre-
sented and inﬂ uencing factors are analysed. The meas-
ures taken by the Swiss National Bank and the Swiss 
Federal Council to curtail the strength of the Swiss franc 
are explained. Based on this, the impact of the strong 
Swiss franc on the global economy is analysed.
The Future of the Euro – Crisis Indicators Signal 
Danger
The future of the euro seems less certain than ever. 
The crisis in the peripheral countries of the eurozone – 
Greece, Portugal and Ireland – has persisted for almost 
two years. In addition, the focus has now shifted to the 
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case of an emergency. The American economist Hyman 
Minsky once said: “If a bank is too big to fail, it is too 
big.”7 In these times of increasingly interconnected ﬁ -
nancial institutions with a high risk of contagion, the IMF 
has termed this “too connected to fail”8.
To prevent such domino effects, the current rescue 
mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility, is 
to be succeeded by the permanent relief fund European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) in mid-2012, rather than in 
mid-2013 as originally planned. The total capital will be 
EUR 700bn. Of this, EUR 80bn will be in the form of paid-
in capital and EUR 620bn in the form of callable capital 
from the euro states.9 The contribution of each country 
is determined by the share of its national central bank in 
the ECB’s capital, which is calculated using a key that 
equally reﬂ ects each country’s share of the total popu-
lation and gross domestic product of the EU. The ECB 
updates the contributions every ﬁ ve years and each time 
a new country joins the EU. If all 27 EU member states 
were taken into account, Germany would contribute 
18.9% of ECB capital. Since only 17 euro states will be 
contributing to the ESM, the German share will be 27.1%. 
Decisions on ESM aid programmes will no longer require 
unanimity by the eurogroup. Such decisions will be tak-
en by a qualiﬁ ed majority of 85% of votes by share of 
ECB capital in case the ECB and the European Commis-
sion conclude that a failure to make an urgent decision 
regarding ﬁ nancial assistance would put the economic 
and ﬁ nancial sustainability of the eurozone at risk. This 
gives each of the three largest eurozone economies, 
Germany (27.1%), France (20.4%) and Italy (17.9%), veto 
power in decisions regarding the use of ESM funds.10
In 2010 and 2011, the heads of state or government of 
the eurozone held 14 emergency summits to try to calm 
the markets. The 13th euro summit in Brussels in late 
October 2011 marked the ﬁ rst time that a debt conver-
sion (nominal discount of 50% on notional Greek debt 
held by private investors) and the creation of a European 
ﬁ scal union (constant economic surveillance of support-
ed states) were agreed upon.
The introduction of national debt brakes modelled on 
the German debt limit, which will become effective in 
2016, was decided at the 14th euro summit in early De-
7  G. B r a u n b e rg e r : Keynes  für jedermann: Die Renaissance des  
Krisenökonomen, Frankfurt am Main 2009, p. 229.
8 IMF Working Paper: Regulatory Capital Charges for Too-Connected-
to-Fail Institutions: A Practical Proposal, April 2010.
9 See ECB: Monthly Bulletin, July 2011, p. 75.
10 See Annex 1 of the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mecha-
nism, http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/582311/05-
tesm2.en12.pdf.
creasing distrust of each other. The price of gold, which 
reached an all-time high of USD 1,921 in September 
2011, can serve as another crisis indicator. Jean-Claude 
Trichet, who was president of the ECB from November 
2003 to October 2011, described the current crisis as 
“the worst global crisis since World War II”4.
The main cause of the crisis is high national debt. The 
four eurozone countries with the highest national debt 
are Greece (163% of GDP), Italy (121%), Ireland (108%) 
and Portugal (102%). Of the ﬁ ve most troubled countries, 
only Spain, at 70%, has a national debt that is signiﬁ -
cantly lower than both the average national debt of euro-
zone countries (88%) as well as that of Germany (82%).5
The weak euro states know that other countries will sup-
port them in case of an emergency in order to prevent a 
domino effect. In the absence of any kind of sanctions, 
this creates an incentive to incur excessive debt (moral 
hazard). The concept of “moral hazard” originates from 
insurance theory and describes the added incentive to 
engage in risky behaviour once an insurance policy has 
been purchased.6 In the context of the banking sector, 
this means that banks tend to make riskier investments, 
knowing that they will receive government bailouts in 
4 Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB, Interview with Die Welt, 
Friday, 7 October 2011, http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2011/html/
sp111011.en.html.
5 Values in per cent of respective GDP, estimate for 2011, source: Euro-
stat.
6 See E. F e e s s : Mikroökonomie: eine spieltheoretische und anwend-
ungsorientierte Einführung, Marburg 1997, p. 765.
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private creditors is meant to reduce the national debt of 
Greece from the current 163% to 120% of the GDP by 
2020. The main problem, however, is that the creditors 
of this national debt (mainly banks and institutional in-
vestors) will have to write down their claims. Numerous 
European banks require government support in order to 
prevent bank failure and thus systemic risks. The cost of 
these support measures largely depends on market re-
action. If debt restructuring is seen as a one-time excep-
tion, the cost will be much lower than if it is regarded as 
a precedent for further cases of national debt restructur-
ing. In December 2011, the heads of state or government 
of the eurozone countries decided to preclude the future 
involvement of private creditors due to inevitable market 
distortions.
Withdrawal from the Eurozone
There is a view that weak crisis-ridden countries should 
withdraw from the eurozone. The direct result for with-
drawing states would be a massive devaluation of the 
new currency by up to 70%, which would initially in-
crease a country’s ability to compete internationally. 
Seen on its own, this constitutes an advantage for ex-
porting companies of the withdrawn country. It would, 
however, also lead to a massive ﬂ ight of capital to states 
with a stable currency, which could cause a collapse 
of the national banking system. Salaries and pensions 
could not be paid, and the food supply would be jeop-
ardised; potential consequences include everything 
from social unrest to a threat to democracy. Withdrawal 
from the eurozone is thus neither a desirable nor a real-
istic alternative.14
Withdrawal is also not to be recommended for stronger 
states. It would lead to a massive upward revaluation of 
the new currency, causing a drop in export earnings and 
an increase in unemployment. Switzerland, for example, 
struggled with an extreme revaluation of the Swiss franc 
because Switzerland is generally seen as a stronghold 
of stability in times of crisis. The exchange rate of the 
Swiss franc rose from CHF 1.50 to the euro in January 
2010 to near parity with the euro in August 2011.15 Re-
introduction of the German mark or the creation of any 
kind of “northern euro” would most likely lead to revalua-
tion pressure at least as high as that on the Swiss franc, 
especially as the market would be much larger than 
Switzerland, meaning greater liquidity and thus higher 
demand. Furthermore, Germany would be in a much 
14  See S. D u l l i e n , D. S c h w a r z e r : Gefährliches  Spiel mit dem Euro-
Ausstieg, in: SWP-Aktuell, No. 54, November 2011.
15 A more detailed discussion about Switzerland follows below.
cember 2011. These debt brakes specify that the annual 
structural, i.e. cyclically adjusted, budget deﬁ cit may 
not exceed 0.5% of the GDP of each state. This rule is 
less strict than the German debt brake, which speciﬁ es 
a limit of 0.35% of GDP.11 The European Commission is 
tasked with monitoring compliance and is given greater 
enforcement privileges. The European Court of Justice 
will verify compliance with debt brake rules. In an inter-
governmental treaty, all EU states, with the exception of 
the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic, agreed on 
automatic sanctions against states in violation of debt 
limits, which only a decision by a qualiﬁ ed majority of 
the Council of Minsters may prevent. This is a reversal 
of the previous practice in which offenders judged of-
fenders. The Stability and Growth Pact was proposed 
by Germany, yet curiously in 2002 it was the two largest 
euro countries, Germany and France, that were the ﬁ rst 
to be found in breach of it, and it was upon their initiative 
that the rules were signiﬁ cantly relaxed.12 The credibility 
of 14 euro summits in 22 months is especially problem-
atic. This means that new resolutions were drafted every 
seven weeks.13
Possible Ways of Solving the Sovereign Debt Crisis
The following possible scenarios for solving the sover-
eign debt crisis are discussed below: debt restructuring, 
withdrawal from the eurozone and creation of a Europe-
an ﬁ scal union.
Debt Restructuring
Debt restructuring involves a debt cut, which forces 
creditors to write off some of their claims. Since there is 
no insolvency law for states like there is for companies 
and private individuals, insolvency in such a case re-
quires a high level of cooperation by all parties involved. 
The immediate advantage for the country restructur-
ing its debt is that the debt burden is reduced in one 
fell swoop. In this case, the agreed debt cut of 50% for 
11  See K.H.  H a u s n e r, S. S i m o n : Die neue Schuldenregel in  Deutsch-
land und die Schuldenbremse der Schweiz – Wege zu nachhaltigen 
öffentlichen Finanzen?, in: Wirtschaftsdienst – Zeitschrift für Wirt-
schaftspolitik, Vol. 89, No. 4, 2009, pp. 265-271.
12 See K.H. H a u s n e r : Der neue Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt und 
die deutsche Staatsverschuldung, in: Wirtschaftsdienst – Zeitschrift 
für Wirtschaftspolitik, Vol. 85, No. 4, 2005, pp. 238-243 and Fis-
cal Federalism in Austria and Germany and the European Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact, in: Public Finance/Finances Publiques, Vol. 54 
(1999/2006), pp. 211-230.
13 The ﬁ rst emergency euro summit took place on 11 February 2010; the 
most recent one on 9 December 2011.
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Thus, the only remaining economically reasonable 
course of action is to implement the ﬁ scal union much 
sooner than would have been the case if the crisis had 
never happened. A political union must be formed to en-
sure democratic legitimacy. The crisis thus serves as a 
catalyst for European integration.
Development of the Swiss Franc to Euro Exchange 
Rate
The European debt crisis has long extended beyond the 
eurozone. Switzerland, has been especially affected, as 
its major trading partner is the European Union. Almost 
60% of all its merchandise exports in 2010 went to the 
EU. Switzerland’s most important trading partner is Ger-
many, which purchases 20% of all Swiss merchandise 
exports.22 The impact on Switzerland can be seen above 
all in the development of the exchange rates. During the 
last two years, the franc increased in value signiﬁ cantly 
against the euro. On 9 August 2011, the euro reached 
a record low of CHF 1.0070. Only since 6 September, 
when the SNB announced its plans to defend the mini-
mum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 by all means, has the 
exchange rate for the euro levelled off between CHF 1.21 
and 1.24 (see Figure 2).
22 See Swiss Federal Customs Administration, http://www.bfs.admin.
ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/06/05/blank/key/handelsbilanz.html.
worse position than Switzerland because it would not 
have the opportunity to peg its currency to those of its 
most important trading partners.16
European Fiscal Union
In the 1990s, before the introduction of the euro, the 
German Bundesbank supported the “coronation theo-
ry”, which held that a common currency should only be 
the crowning achievement of a political union.17 It is ob-
vious that a uniﬁ ed monetary policy is only sustainable 
if it is combined with a coordinated ﬁ scal policy. The 
economic consequence would be for the member states 
to relinquish their budgetary autonomy to the European 
Union. This would, however, mean a signiﬁ cant loss of 
national sovereignty, as control over public ﬁ nances is 
considered one of the last bastions of a sovereign state. 
The larger member states Germany and France would 
especially have trouble accepting this step. Udo Di 
Fabio, a judge at the German Constitutional Court, ﬁ t-
tingly referred to budgetary power as the “crown jewel of 
parliament”.18
A paper by former ECB chief economist Jürgen Stark et 
al. proposes signiﬁ cantly stricter provisions for the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact. According to this paper, national 
budget deﬁ cits must be approved by the EU in order to 
prevent excessive debt. This could entail ﬁ nancial re-
ceivership for states with excessive budget deﬁ cits, 
which would severely limit national budget autonomy.19
Habermas20 accurately laments the lack of EU powers for 
the necessary harmonisation of the national economies, 
which are drastically drifting apart in terms of their pow-
er to compete, and consequently calls for the creation of 
a political union. This union cannot be achieved march-
ing in lockstep, however, but will most likely increasingly 
be made up of states moving at different speeds. The 
concept of a core Europe, consisting of a vanguard of 
states willing to integrate, for certain policy areas (e.g. 
euro or Schengen) without exclusion of the other mem-
bers seems to be the most promising model.21
16 See German Council of Economic Experts: Verantwortung für Europa 
wahrnehmen, Annual Report 2011/12, p. 98.
17 See G. G a l a h n : Die Deutsche Bundesbank im Prozeß der eu-
ropäischen Währungsintegration: rechtliche und währungspolitische 
Fragen aus deutscher Sicht, Berlin, New York 1996, p. 27.
18 See http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-80266934.html.
19  See L.  S c h u k n e c h t ,  P.  M o u t o t ,  P.  R o t h e r,  J.  S t a r k :  The Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact – Crisis and Reform. European Central Bank Oc-
casional Paper Series No 129, September 2011.
20 See J. H a b e r m a s : Zur Verfassung Europas, Berlin 2011, p. 40.
21 See W. We i d e n f e l d : Die Europäische Union, 2. ed., München 2011, 
pp. 201-207.
Figure 2
Swiss Franc to Euro Nominal Exchange Rate
S o u rc e : European Central Bank.
1.00
1.10
1.20
1.30
1.40
1.50
1.60
Aug. 09 Dec. 09 Apr. 10 Aug. 10 Dec. 10 Apr. 11 Aug. 11
Intereconomics 2012 | 2
116
Swiss Economy
long as the economic prospects for the eurozone do not 
stabilise considerably.
Measures to Weaken the Swiss Franc
Since the strength of the Swiss franc is a problem that 
affects the whole of the economy, it must be tackled not 
only by the SNB and its monetary instruments but also 
by the state and its ﬁ scal policy.
The SNB started taking liquidity measures against the 
overrated Swiss franc on 3 August 2011.28 It announced 
that it would lower the target range of three-month Libor 
to 0.0–0.25% and aim for a three-month Libor close to 
0.0%. Furthermore, it announced that it wanted to raise 
the sight deposits of domestic banks at the SNB from 
CHF 30bn to CHF 80bn. This limit was continuously ex-
tended during the following weeks until sight deposits 
were ultimately more than CHF 250bn. To provide the 
Swiss franc ﬁ nancial market with such high liquidity, the 
SNB used a number of instruments such as foreign ex-
change swaps and repo agreements.29 The M3 money 
supply increased by around CHF 35bn solely in the pe-
riod from January to August 2011. On 6 September, the 
SNB set a minimum rate of CHF 1.20 to the euro. In a 
statement, the SNB said that it was “aiming for a sub-
stantial and sustained weakening of the Swiss franc” 
and that “it will no longer tolerate a EUR/CHF exchange 
rate below one Swiss franc twenty”. It added: “[The SNB] 
is prepared to purchase foreign exchange in unlimited 
quantities. … If the economic outlook and deﬂ ationary 
risks demand it, the SNB will take further measures.”30 
This minimum exchange rate is widely accepted by busi-
nessmen, politicians and academics in Switzerland31, al-
though some regard it as too low.32 Since then, the SNB 
has successfully defended its exchange rate target and 
recently conﬁ rmed the exchange rate of 1.20 francs to 
the euro in its assessment of the monetary situation of 
December 2011. The SNB “will continue to enforce the 
minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro with the 
utmost determination. ... Even at the current rate, the 
Swiss franc is still high and should continue to weaken 
over time.”33
28 See Swiss National Bank Quarterly Bulletin 3/2011, Volume 29, p. 53.
29 Cf. J.-P. D a n t h i n e : Introductory note to the news conference, Bern, 
15 Nov. 2011. 
30 P. H i l d e b r a n d : Short statement with regard to the introduction of a 
minimum Swiss franc exchange rate against the euro on 6 Sep. 2011, 
Bern. 
31 See Neu Zürcher Zeitung: Viel Lob für SNB-Entscheid, 7 Sep. 2011, 
p. 27.
32 See Neu Zürcher Zeitung am Sonntag: Seco rechnet mit 40 000 
zusätzlichen Arbeitslosen, 6 Nov. 2011, p. 40.
33 Press release: monetary policy assessment of 15 Dec. 2011, p. 1.
The drama of currency developments is placed some-
what in perspective when the real exchange rate is taken 
as a base. But also in real terms, the Swiss franc has 
strongly increased in value against the euro in recent 
quarters. In order to decide whether the Swiss franc re-
ally is overrated, we must answer the question of what 
a fair exchange rate is. According to the theory of pur-
chasing power parity, this fair exchange rate would be 
about 1.35 francs to the euro.23 It should be taken into 
consideration, however, that there are large differences 
in purchasing power throughout the eurozone. A fair ex-
change rate with Germany would be lower, for example, 
than an exchange rate with Greece.24 It is, however, clear 
that the Swiss franc actually is overvalued at its current 
rate of just over 1.20 to the euro.
Reasons for the Strength of the Swiss Franc
The economic uncertainty caused by the European debt 
crisis is surely the main cause of the current strength of 
the Swiss franc and even more so of the strong appre-
ciation of the franc against the euro in recent quarters. 
Large budget deﬁ cits and high levels of debt in the euro 
countries led to a major loss of conﬁ dence in the ﬁ nan-
cial markets and caused investors to buy Swiss francs. 
This resulted yet again in the “safe-haven” effect of the 
Swiss franc in times of crisis25, i.e. the fundamental facts 
of the real economy are a less decisive factor for inves-
tors than the lack of safe investment alternatives.26
The strength of the Swiss franc cannot, however, be ex-
plained by the safe-haven effect alone. There are also 
numerous structural reasons for the long-term apprecia-
tion of the Swiss franc against the euro.27 For one thing, 
the nominal strength of the Swiss franc will prevail as 
long as the inﬂ ation rate in the EU signiﬁ cantly exceeds 
that in Switzerland. For another thing, Switzerland tra-
ditionally has a strong export sector, which regularly 
leads to trade balance surpluses and increases the de-
mand for Swiss francs worldwide to pay for Swiss export 
products. Additionally, Switzerland also features sta-
ble, long-term macroeconomic conditions ranging from 
sound public budgets to moderate taxation. Financial 
and real-capital investors will continue to be attracted as 
23 See UBS Outlook Schweiz, 4th quarter 2011, p. 11; see also Econ-
omiesuisse: Frankenstärke – was tun? Dossierpolitik 9/2011, p. 3.
24 See T. F l u r y, G. S t a u n o v o : Currency Market. Is the euro fair? 
Wealth Management Research UBS, 20 July 2010.
25 See J.-P. D a n t h i n e : The strong franc and the future of Switzerland’s 
ﬁ nancial market infrastructure: Two current challenges for the SNB, 
speech at the Money Market Event in Geneva on 3 Nov. 2011, pp. 9 f.
26 See T. J o rd a n : Auswirkungen der Staatsverschuldung auf die Una-
bhängigkeit der Geldpolitik, speech at the 21st International Europe 
Forum Lucerne on 8 Nov. 2011, p. 9.
27 See Economiesuisse, op. cit., pp. 4 ff.
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to Switzerland is from the eurozone, and most foreign 
visitors come not for business but for vacation and rec-
reation. Price increases caused by the currency situation 
play an important role in decisions made by tourists.37 
Besides the tourism industry, the ﬁ nancial sector is also 
feeling the negative consequences of the strong Swiss 
franc.38 Because of the safe-haven effect, foreign money 
does indeed go to Switzerland, but a large part of the 
revenue is generated in foreign currencies, while costs 
are mainly incurred in Swiss francs.
In comparison, the impact is less strong on companies 
that produce mainly for the domestic market and ex-
port businesses that obtain products from the eurozone 
and/or work in specialised, niche markets, where price 
competitiveness is less of an issue. In the meantime, a 
number of companies have adopted strategies such as 
extending working hours without pay increases, paying 
some of their employees – cross-border commuters from 
adjacent euro countries – in euros or writing invoices to 
foreign customers in Swiss francs if their market position 
allows them to do so.39 What is more, the extraordinary 
liquidity measures of the SNB in the summer of 2011 
considerably reduced short- as well as long-term inter-
est rates.40 A substantial amount of short-term interest 
rates were even negative; investors have been willing to 
accept slight losses in their investments because of their 
fear that foreign investments could lead to even greater 
losses. On the whole, the difference in interest rates in 
comparison to the euro countries increased signiﬁ cantly, 
and comparatively low-interest loans are now available 
for Swiss companies, which may also lessen the impact 
of the strong Swiss franc.
In a survey of 164 Swiss companies, 58% of the sur-
veyed companies stated that they were affected by the 
revaluation of the Swiss franc. Companies in the chemi-
cal, pharmaceutical, metal, mechanical engineering and 
textile and clothing industries as well as manufacturers 
of electronic products and precision instruments experi-
enced the strongest negative effects of the revaluation.41 
These effects can now be seen in ofﬁ cial statistics.
The Swiss economy slowed down considerably in the 
third quarter of 2011, when the real gross domestic prod-
uct only increased by 0.2%. Positive economic growth 
37  See E. K re i l k a m p : Produkt- und Preispolitik, in: G. H a e d r i c h , C. 
K a s p e r, K. K l e m m , E. K re i l k a m p  (eds): Tourismusmanagement, 
3rd ed., Berlin 1998, pp. 325-357.
38 See Economiesuisse, op. cit., p. 9.
39 See F. G i l g e n : Diesen Firmen kann der starke Franken nichts an-
haben, Neu Zürcher Zeitung of 9 Oct. 2011, p. 43.
40 See J.-P. D a n t h i n e : Introductory note ..., op. cit.
41 See SNB: Quartalsheft 2/2011, Bern, p. 40.
In addition to the SNB, the state also responded to the 
strength of the Swiss franc. Unlike the SNB, the Swiss 
government cannot directly affect the strength of the 
franc but can attempt to soften its impact on the national 
economy. In late summer, the Swiss Federal Council an-
nounced a catalogue of support measures for 2011 with 
a volume of CHF 870 million. More than half of these 
funds are for unemployment insurance, about CHF 210 
million will be used for stimulating knowledge and tech-
nology transfers, and another CHF 100 million will bene-
ﬁ t the hospitality industry via the Swiss Society for Hotel 
Credit (Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Hotelkredit).34 
It is, however, widely agreed that ﬁ scal impulses of this 
kind can only be short-lived and that only permanent im-
provements to macroeconomic conditions (e.g. reducing 
bureaucracy) can sustainably strengthen the economic 
attractiveness of a country and thus compensate for 
losses caused by the exchange rate.35
Impact of the Strong Franc on Switzerland
The strong Swiss franc has affected Switzerland and will 
continue to be felt in ofﬁ cial statistics and corporate bal-
ance sheets in the future, since many changes such as 
dismissals only appear after a delay and a further weak-
ening of the Swiss franc is not expected soon.
Effects on Companies and the National Economy
The export industry is particularly affected by the strong 
external value of the franc.36 The negative effects, how-
ever, are distributed unevenly. In particular export-ori-
ented companies that do not work in niche markets, do 
not have a high degree of specialisation or do not pur-
chase goods or services from “cheap” foreign countries 
are having difﬁ culties, as is the case with the paper in-
dustry. Such companies are forced to reduce prices in 
order to stay competitive in international markets. As a 
consequence, their proﬁ t margins will continue to de-
crease unless they are able to reduce their costs. If these 
companies relocate their businesses, lay off workers or 
reduce the prices they pay for materials and services, 
the economy as a whole will be directly affected.
What applies to many branches of the export industry 
applies especially to tourism. One out of three visitors 
34 For more details, see http://www.seco.admin.ch/ak-
tuell/00277/01164/01980/index.html?lang=de&msg-id=40867.
35 See Economiesuisse, op. cit., p. 12.
36 See ibid., pp. 6 ff.
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ment to further increase during the coming year as a re-
sult of the strong Swiss franc.
Consequently, economic research institutes revised 
down the growth forecast for the GDP for 2012. While 
the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) still 
expects GDP growth of 0.5% compared with the pre-
vious year, the Swiss Economic Institute (KOF) of the 
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich (ETH) 
only expects GDP growth of 0.2%.
Effects on Consumers
Swiss consumers have unqualiﬁ ed beneﬁ ts from the 
strong Swiss franc as long as they spend their holidays in 
eurozone countries. Those who live near the border have 
also been taking advantage of the exchange rate. Shop-
ping tourism in the eurozone is booming. To what extent 
consumers of domestic goods and services are noticing 
savings depends on whether reduced prices are passed 
on to them or not. In 2007, the SNB ﬁ rst looked into the 
question of whether exchange rate ﬂ uctuations were re-
ﬂ ected in import prices and consumer pricing.46 SECO’s 
analysis of the present situation shows that a revaluation 
of the Swiss franc results in a reduction in import prices 
after about four quarterly periods with a probability of 
40%.47 Depending on the category of goods, however, 
savings are not always sufﬁ ciently passed on. Over the 
course of one year, price differences between Switzer-
land and Germany increased by 15 percentage points, 
which just about equals the change in the exchange rate. 
Surprisingly, this increase also occurred in goods with a 
high percentage of imported products, which suggests 
that reductions in import price will not be felt by con-
sumers.48 This ﬁ nding adds weight to the discussion in 
Switzerland about it being an “island of high prices”49. 
“The strong Swiss franc has merely accentuated a struc-
tural problem.”50
Implications for the Swiss National Bank
The impact of the strong Swiss franc and the conse-
quences of the resulting monetary measures are particu-
larly clear in the SNB balance sheet.
46 See S t u l z : Exchange Rate Pass-Through in Switzerland: Evidence 
from Vector Autoregressions, SNB Economic Studies, No. 4, 2007.
47 See SECO: Weitergabe von Einkaufsvorteilen aufgrund der Franken-
stärke. Working Paper, Bern 2011.
48 See P. B a l a s t è r : Weitergabe von Einkaufsvorteilen aufgrund der 
Frankenstärke, in: Die Volkswirtschaft. Das Magazin für Wirtschaft-
spolitik; No. 11, 2011, pp. 56-60.
49  G. B u c h w a l d e r : Überhöhte Preise: Kampf gegen  Windmühlen?, in: 
Die Volkswirtschaft. Das Magazin für Wirtschaftspolitik, No. 11, 2011, 
p. 65.
50 Ibid.
was created by private and public consumption and by 
new construction, whereas exports (-1.2%) as well as 
plant and equipment spending (-2.3%) decreased for the 
ﬁ rst time.42 While tourism exports have been shrinking 
for a year now, declines in the remaining service exports 
as well as the exports of goods followed later and are not 
as bad as feared (see Figure 3).43 However, the decline in 
exports would likely have been worse if measures had 
not been taken by the SNB.44 In addition, the minimum 
exchange rate has unquestionably given companies 
more reliability for planning. There has thus been a con-
siderable minimisation of risks in contrast to the situa-
tion before 6 September 2011, when the euro was in free 
fall against the Swiss franc.
The strength of the Swiss franc has started to have an 
impact on the job market as well. According to season-
ally adjusted ﬁ gures, unemployment rose slightly for the 
ﬁ rst time in two years.45 Economists expect unemploy-
42 See SECO: Konjunkturtendenzen Winter 2011/2012, Bern, p. 13.
43 See SECO: Press Release, 1 March 2012.
44 See Neue Zürcher Zeitung: Starke Wachstumsverlangsamung in der 
Schweiz, 2 Dec. 2011, p. 27.
45 See SECO. op. cit., p. 22.
Figure 3
Export Development1
1 Seasonally adjusted quarterly ﬁ gures, at prices of the previous year.
S o u rc e : State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO).
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that foreign exchange reserves increased by about CHF 
100bn to CHF 305bn during this period54, which was 
mainly a consequence of the foreign currency measures 
(e.g. foreign exchange swaps) carried out before the in-
troduction of the minimum exchange rate. At almost CHF 
155bn, the majority of these investments were in euros. 
On average, the investments in euros were around 51% 
in previous years.55 By November 2011, the currency 
holdings of the SNB were again reduced to CHF 262bn. 
The SNB has already drawn conclusions from currency-
induced uncertainty and has reduced the annual distri-
bution of proﬁ ts to the federal and canton governments 
from CHF 2.5bn per year to CHF 1bn.
Conclusion
The euro crisis is having an impact on the Swiss econo-
my. Export-oriented industries are particularly affected 
because the strong Swiss franc has reduced their abil-
ity to compete in terms of price. The domestic economy 
has also felt the effects of the strong Swiss franc, for 
example, as a result of the strategies adopted by export 
businesses. The strong Swiss franc has therefore be-
come a challenge for the economy as a whole. The SNB 
initially reacted by carrying out measures to increase li-
quidity and eventually introduced a minimum exchange 
rate of 1.20 francs to the euro. The SNB has managed 
to defend this minimum rate with relatively little effort 
because, from the perspective of market participants, it 
is clearly below the equilibrium rate. This, however, ex-
plains why the situation will remain difﬁ cult for a large 
part of the economy. In addition, global demand is de-
creasing as the global economy slows down. According 
to the SNB inﬂ ation forecast, there are no noticeable in-
ﬂ ationary risks for Switzerland in spite of its expansion-
ary monetary policy56, which means that in this regard it 
will be able to maintain the minimum exchange rate. The 
euro crisis is, however, not over for Switzerland. Seldom 
have the well-being of the Swiss economy in general and 
the success of Swiss monetary policy in particular been 
this dependent on the euro. “If the eurozone manages to 
solve its problems, the safe-haven effect will lose its im-
portance and the Swiss franc … will become weaker. If 
there are, on the other hand, major problems ahead, the 
minimum exchange rate will become truly expensive.”57
54 See balance sheet items of the SNB of 31 Oct. 2011.
55 See SNB: Bilanzpositionen der SNB per Ende November 2011, Bern, 
p. 13.
56 See SNB: Einleitende Bemerkung zur geldpolitischen La-
gebeurteilung, 15 Dec. 2011, Bern, p. 4.
57  P.A. F i s c h e r : Nationalbank-Erfolge ..., op. cit.
At the end of the ﬁ rst half of 2011, the SNB showed a loss 
of CHF 10.8bn. This was caused mainly by losses on for-
eign currency positions of some CHF 10bn, which were a 
consequence of exchange rate-induced valuation loss-
es.51 The SNB subsequently experienced a massive loss 
of equity, which caused some anxiety and led Thomas J. 
Jordan, vice chairman of the SNB, to make a statement 
in which he stressed the SNB’s capacity to act even at 
negative equity levels:
… the SNB cannot be compared with commercial 
banks or other private enterprises. For one thing, a 
central bank cannot become illiquid. This means that 
a central bank’s capacity to act is not constrained if 
its equity turns temporarily negative. Moreover, unlike 
other enterprises, it is not forced to implement recov-
ery measures or go into administration. For another, 
central banks enjoy a funding advantage … owing to 
their banknote-issuing privilege, and, in the long term, 
they are able to rebuild their equity after suffering 
losses.52
The SNB, however, was able to turn this loss into a 
consolidated proﬁ t of CHF 5.8bn in the third quarter of 
2011 as a result of the combination of a weakening of 
the Swiss franc due to the minimum exchange rate and 
the high price of gold. In addition, the SNB had only had 
relatively small expenditures for measures to defend its 
exchange rate goal.
The introduction of a minimum exchange rate has 
not had serious consequences, because the major-
ity of market participants are of the opinion that the 
chosen minimum rate is clearly below an equilibrium 
exchange rate and because the SNB can afford to de-
fend it as no serious inﬂ ationary threats are expect-
ed.53
In addition, the market response to the minimum ex-
change rate is also clear proof of the trustworthiness of 
the SNB. And yet this positive result cannot hide the fact 
that the euro crisis is far from over and that the uncon-
ventional monetary policy of the SNB resulted in a bloat-
ed balance sheet total, which leads to higher volatility. 
While the balance sheet total was just under CHF 270bn 
at the end of 2010, it reached its highest level at just over 
CHF 381bn in September 2011. It is hardly surprising 
51 See SNB: Zwischenbericht der Schweizerischen Nationalbank, 
30 June 2011, Zurich, www.snb.ch.
52 T.J. J o rd a n : Does the Swiss National Bank need equity? Remarks 
at the Statistisch-VolkswirtschaftlicheGesellschaft Basel on 28 Sep. 
2011, p. 2.
53 P.A. F i s c h e r : Nationalbank-Erfolge mit wenig Schatten, in: NZZ of 1 
Nov. 2011, p. 21.
